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Flowers are free beauties of nature. Hardly anyone but a botanist 
knows the true nature of a flower, and even he, while recognizing in 
the flower the reproductive organ of the plant, pays no attention to 
this natural end when using his taste to judge of its beauty. Hence no 
perfection of any kind – no internal finality, as something to which 
the arrangement of the manifold is related – underlies this 
judgement. Many birds (the parrot, the humming-bird, the bird of 
paradise), and a number of crustacea, are self-subsisting beauties 
which are not appurtenant to any object defined with respect to its 
end, but please freely and on their own account. So designs a la 
grecque, foliage for framework or on wall-papers, etc., have no 
intrinsic meaning; they represent nothing – no object under a definite 
concept – and are free beauties ...1 
 
Introduction  
A very genial account might be given of window-shopping if one adopted 
Kant’s notion of free as opposed to adherent beauty. Its function and utility 
rescinded from, anything might become a focus of ‘the free play of the 
cognitive faculties’, a free play that – for Kant – constitutes the aesthetic 
attitude/experience. What window-shopping exactly is not, is illustrated by the 
story of a rich Texan who went window-shopping and came home with a 
truckload of big sheets of plate-glass, many elegantly lettered. 
Window-shopping can slip into actual shopping: things in shop windows 
are in a state of suspended utility, objects of pure regard, attractively arranged, 
often in a ‘this goes with that at Sussan’ way.2 The aim, nevertheless, of the 
shopkeeper is that pure regard will slip into desire and desire into purchase. 
Whether purchase issues in use is of less concern to the shopkeeper than is 
purchase. Purchase, even so, more or less implies that the suspended utility will 
become un-suspended in the unwrapping and use of objects seen first in a 
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1 Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Aesthetic Judgement, trans. James Creed Meredith  
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928 [1911]), §16. 
2 Sussan is an Australian middle–market women’s wear chain, good at matching accessories 
and so on. Its advertising slogan, ‘this goes with that at Sussan,’ was written by the 
distinguished poet Les Murray while moonlighting. 
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shop-display. Men are said to go specifically shopping for ‘X’: women are said 
to go window-shopping – and end up by purchasing. I do not believe this for a 
moment; men and women may shop in like ways. Being a window-shopper 
who enjoys the window dressing of Henry Buck’s3 and the antique jewellery 
trays in the better jewellers, and the occasional pawnshop, I am unisex in my 
buying habits. Over years of admiring antique rings, cufflinks, and so on, I 
have bought one ring. An almost-perfect window-shopper’s record broken? On 
the other hand, I have a lot of shirts that are in the wardrobe of a fallen 
window-shopper. 
The finest window-shopper in modern times may have been Andy 
Warhol, who went – endlessly – window-shopping and falling into actual 
shopping, indeed. But what he brought home remained in its wrapping. A 
photograph in a New Yorker shows Warhol’s elegant Art Deco dining room, 
full of parcels big and small, there after their owner’s death, pristine and crisp, 
if a little dusty. (The dust! This is reminiscent of the carefully varnished-down 
dust on Duchamp’s metal elements in the Large Glass).4 
To buy but not to buy! To take a free beauty from a shop and buy it – 
not into slavery/use – but at once to manumit it with respect and utility, and let 
it be in idleness. An elegant aesthetic move, this of Warhol’s: and, in a 
consumer society, striking. It was a nice gesture indeed from Warhol, whose 
iconography and production were very much a function of that same consumer 
society, critiqued by Marxists with their phrase ‘the fetishisation of the 
commodity.’ Warhol’s compulsive shopping may be read as an act of grace – 
aesthetic grace at least – in so far as much of what he bought was not put to 
use. Useless possession with its uselessness highlighted is the gesture of a 
modern dandy. Oscar Wilde would have admired this, though Beau Brummell 
might have been puzzled. He may have been the first dandy, but was 
something, too, of a utilitarian, and a dress reformer, who insisted on one’s 
washing oneself, and on wearing clean linen each day. 
 
Ready-mades and Free Beauty 
In an earlier article on Duchamp I have suggested that the suspension of utility, 
the deliberate denaturing of the imminent teleology of objects, is for Duchamp 
a necessary (though not necessary and sufficient) condition of Duchamp-the-
                                                        
3 Henry Buck’s is an upmarket Melbourne menswear shop that issues its customers lavish 
catalogues, which make armchair window-shopping possible. 
4 On the dust on elements of Duchamp’s Large Glass, see ‘Dust Collecting’ (1920), in 
Calvin Tompkins, The World of Marcel Duchamp: 1887–1968 (Amsterdam: Time 
International, 1977), p. 159. 
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Magus making readymade objects into Ready-mades.5 The sufficient condition 
was that a Magus, Marcel Duchamp, declared for example, the bottle rack to be 
‘A Ready-made!’ This necessary condition must be borne in mind as we 
consider Duchamp on shop windows. Shop windows are places where 
teleology is kept in suspense or on ice, until it issues: (a) in purchase; itself (b) 
the condition of actual use. Duchamp had, in all his work, the idea of delay, as 
a kind of ideal. Total abstention goes, however, a bit beyond mere delay. As 
we shall see, Duchamp may, when faced with the shop window, be a total 
abstainer. Further, and in a different register, Duchamp’s shop window passage 
may force a modification of the account of the Magus-making of Ready-mades 
which I gave in my previous article as: (1) denaturing the readymade object; 
(2) making it a Ready-made by performative utterance; and (3) so fetishising it. 
The shop-window examples seem (a) to elide move 2 and, (b) to perform 3 
upon the instant, in such a way as (c), even, to collapse move 1. 
 
Duchamp: Window Dressing, Window Shopping 
Warhol’s buying but not unwrapping might not have met Duchamp’s standards 
at all, mere purchase being – probably – an absolute fall from grace (aesthetic 
grace). We shall consider this a little later. First, it is useful to look at 
Duchamp’s essays in window-dressing. In Anne d’Harnoncourt’s 
‘Introduction’ to the catalogue Marcel Duchamp there is a passage on 
Duchamp’s art and anti-art where she asks whether Duchamp’s dressing of a 
book store window, Brentano’s on Fifth Avenue New York in 1943,6 
constituted a work of art – or a Ready-made – or both? Or neither? Neither if 
the exercise was simply to sell copies of Denis de Rougemont’s La part du 
diable. Both, if Duchamp’s Midas-like touch transformed everything he 
handled into a Ready-made and, thus, into a work of ‘art.’ And, again, both, 
insofar as the window dressing included a half-undressed mannequin, a ready-
made made a Ready-made by being in a bookshop, not a boutique, window. 
                                                        
5 Patrick Hutchings, ‘The Ready–mades of Marcel Duchamp: Cut Flowers or Les Fleurs du 
Mal?’, Literature and Aesthetics, vol. 10 (2000), pp. 31–50. 
6 On Duchamp as window–dresser and the Brentano display advertising de Rougemont’s  
La part du diable, in 1943, see Anne d’Harnoncourt, ‘Introduction’, in Marcel Duchamp,  
eds Anne d’Harnoncourt and Kynaston McShine (Prestel Verlag: The Museum of  
Modern Art and Philadelphia Museum of Art, 1973), p. 23. Calvin Tompkins, Duchamp:  
A Biography (London: Chatto and Windus, 1997) records that, as a result of public  
outrage, the window display was moved to the Gotham Book Mart on 47th Street. There  
is a photograph of this display on p. 349. The book advertised in the Gotham Book Mart  
display is André Breton’s Arcane 7. Duchamp also (un)-dressed a mannequin in a Dada  
set of three, for example in the 1938 International Surrealist Exhibition in Paris. See Calvin  
Tompkins, The World of Marcel Duchamp, p. 159. 
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Though Duchamp’s condition for selecting candidates for ready-mades 
transformed into Ready-mades was utter indifference to the books for sale, so, 
as far as the books were concerned, window-dressing by Duchamp might cash 
out as mere visual-merchandising, like any other. They were simple 
merchandise; the figure was a Ready-made. 
However, if Duchamp was intending that people buy books from the 
window which he had dressed, this would be quite contra to his famous – and 
puzzling – remark on shop windows, and the need to stop at window-shopping. 
Buying, for Duchamp, is somehow taboo. There is a many-layered text by 
Duchamp on shop-windows, the end (if not the conclusion) of which is to 
enforce the taboo of acquisition or acquisition-plus-use. Window-shopping is 
made oddly absolute: 
When one undergoes the interrogation of shop windows, one also 
pronounces one’s own sentence. In fact, one’s choice is ‘round trip.’ 
From the demand of shop windows, from the inevitable response to 
shop windows, the fixation of choice is determined [se conclut 
l’arrêt du choix]. No obstinacy, ad absurdum, of hiding the coition 
through a glass pane with one or many objects of the shop windows 
[s’en mordre le pouces] as soon as possession is consummated. 
Q.E.D.7 
The Q.E.D. suggests this is (part of) an argument. The argument is not 
complete in this attenuated quotation; we shall look at a fuller variant in 
another translation later. Let us begin by working back up from the end; 
possession consummated induces the profoundest regret. Does it? Why? Well 
as to ‘why,’ the free-beauty-state of the objects in the shop window – their 
being objects of pure regard – is abolished. They become mere objects without 
the – mysterious – freedom of free beauties.8 Unless, of course, one is Andy 
Warhol, and can possess without consuming. A mariage blanc to an object, 
leaving it in its wrapping, is a modern dandy’s exercise in pure aestheticism. 
One has a – kind of – argument here in exegesis of the Duchamp 
passage. But the passage contains rum elements that this ‘argument’ – if such it 
be – does not touch upon. There are two odd moves: (1) the referring of the 
experience we have with objects in shop windows as coition. The expression is 
at once too strong, and misplaced. This is because the desire which an object in 
a shop-window inspires is not by any means usually sexual; one desires a 
                                                        
7 Jerrold Seigel, The Private Worlds of Marcel Duchamp: Desire, Liberation, and the Self in 
Modern Culture (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1995), p. 29. 
8 Kant’s discussions of freedom in general are less than satisfactory, and his notion of free 
beauty is not free of this general unsatisfactoriness. See Denis Dutton, ‘The Experience of 
Art is Paradise Regained: Kant on Free and Dependent Beauty’, British Journal of 
Aesthetics, vol. 34 (1994): 226–241. 
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necktie in Henry Buck’s in an unheated way. This, however, is of no account to 
Duchamp if – as I have suggested elsewhere – the upshot of making a ready-
made a Ready-made is that it is fetishised: It is just, thus, that he treats window 
displays and r/Ready-mades, sliding from indifference with respect to r, to 
fetishisation with respect to R. But ‘coition’ – which does not occur through 
plate glass – is referred to because all desire is (wrongly) held (here and 
elsewhere by Duchamp) to entail sexuality; all objects of desire are treated by 
him as though they are objects of sexual desire, even – although it seems silly – 
the blue and white silk tie in Buck’s window.  
The over-description of our (possible) enjoyment of the objects in the 
shop-window, even while they are still safe behind the glass, seems to have at 
its root a Jansenist collapsing of all desire into concupiscence, and of 
concupiscence itself into actual sin. To these remarks-in-exegesis one might 
add that coition is exactly what does not happen through plate glass. Think of 
the utter pathos of wives visiting their convict husbands and ‘kissing’ through 
bullet-proof glass. The Jansenist absurdity provides a clue to Duchamp’s use of 
the word ‘penalty.’ All one has done to the objects in the shop is, (i) look at 
them, or (ii) possibly look at them as free beauties. This incurs a ‘penalty.’ 
Why? Because to look is to desire, and to desire is to desire illicitly. So one 
may as well go the whole hog, ‘cut the pane,’ get the object, or objects, and 
then bite one’s thumbs: (a) because one looked, and this, already, incurs a 
penalty; and (b) because any object thus had is not worth the having. The short 
version of all this is: To look is to fetishise: fetishes essentially disappoint. 
‘One or many objects’ may be the cynosure of the concupiscent gaze: 
whatever is/are so gazed upon becomes/become fetish/es. What is denatured by 
this gaze is not, then, made a free beauty, but sold into the harem of an 
Indifferent Potentate. The shop-window passage re-writes the protocols of 
making an r an R: The concupiscent regard makes, by ‘coition,’ a fetish of the 
object(s) regarded, quite eliding performative utterance. We have noted this 
already. But is even the Magus himself dealt out of the game? Is the person in 
front of the shop window not always Duchamp, but possibly, just anybody? 
Well, anybody who has ‘coition’ with displayed merchandise can and must eo 
ipso fetishise, so why not also make an R of any r? The trouble with this is that 
nobody would take any notice. We can all be concupiscent, but only 
Duchamp’s Ready-mades interest the public. He is a Magus; anyone else is just 
odd if they seek to canonize a banal manufactured object. And if they fetishise 
things, they need to present to a competent psychiatrist. No one is a Magus to 
their valet or their psychotherapist. Duchamp himself needed the success and 
scandal of Nude Descending a Staircase II to give him the status successfully 
to force and utter Ready-mades. 
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It is received wisdom in Duchampian discourse that the sexual 
satisfactions of the Large Glass are onanistic. And the Large Glass is the 
apotheosis, perhaps, of the shop window. If the sexual satisfactions of the 
denuded Bride occur – in some future moment, where the yet-still-uncompleted 
work is completed? – they will occur as mechanised sexual activity occurring 
between two panes of glass, even! In Duchamp’s demand that we do not come 
to possess the objects in the shop-window there seems to be what Duchamp 
himself calls elsewhere, ‘strictness of a Huguenot sort.’ In his fetishisation of 
the ‘malic moulds,’ his putting of banal shapes from a clothing catalogue into 
an erotic context, but one in which the erotic is suggested rather than 
represented, is a kind of boundless license. Marcel Duchamp and Moliére’s 
Tartuffe, with a new twist. Too pure to buy a chocolate grinder but so naughty 
as to make of it an erotic object; a fetish, indeed. Concerning fetishes (not his 
own) Duchamp observed in an interview with Pierre Cabanne; ‘it’s a little like 
masturbation.’9 The second odd move (2) is from free beauties to onanism. 
And the idea that art-is-masturbation remains unconvincing. 
Art for Duchamp is generally erotic, in the sense that his remarks to 
Cabanne make, more or less, clear: 
CABANNE: What is the place of eroticism in your work? 
DUCHAMP: Enormous. Visible or conspicuous, or, at any rate, 
underlying. 
CABANNE: In “The Bride” for example? 
DUCHAMP: It’s there, too, but it was a closed-in eroticism, if you 
like, an eroticism which wasn’t overt. It wasn’t implied, either. It’s a 
sort of erotic climate. Everything can be based on an erotic climate 
without too much trouble. 
I believe in eroticism a lot, because it’s truly a rather widespread 
thing throughout the world, a thing that everyone understands. It 
replaces, if you wish, what other literary schools called Symbolism, 
Romanticism. It could be another “ism,” so to speak. You’re going 
to tell me that there can be eroticism in Romanticism, also. But if 
eroticism is used as a principle basis, a principle end, then in takes 
the form of an “ism,” in the sense of a school. 
CABANNE: What personal definition of eroticism would you give? 
DUCHAMP: I don’t give it a personal definition, but basically it’s 
really a way to try to bring out in the daylight things that are 
constantly hidden – and that aren’t necessarily erotic – because of 
the Catholic religion, and because of social rules. To be able to 
reveal them, and to place them at everyone’s disposal – I think this is 
important because it’s the basis of everything and no one talks about 
it. Eroticism was a theme, even an “ism,” which was the basis of 
                                                        
9 Pierre Cabanne, Dialogues with Marcel Duchamp (New York: Da Capo, 1979), p. 100. 
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everything I was doing at the time of the “Large Glass.” It kept me 
from being obligated to return to already existing theories, aesthetic 
or otherwise. 
CABANNE: Still, in your work, this eroticism has remained 
disguised for rather a long time. 
DUCHAMP: Always disguised, more or less, but not disguised out 
of shame. 
CABANNE: No, hidden. 
DUCHAMP: That’s it. 
CABANNE: Let’s say underlying. 
DUCHAMP: Underlying, yes.10 
I have considered much of this Cabanne dialogue in my earlier paper. However 
the ‘smash-and-grab’ vocabulary of Duchamp’s shop-window passage now 
becomes – clearly and paradoxically – erotic. One obtains objects from shop 
windows not by ‘cutting the pane,’ but by going into the shop and putting 
down one’s money. How much more elegant, though, would Duchamp’s 
‘cutting the pane’ be than just chucking a brick through the glass! Duchamp 
would be a very stylish robber; but he wishes to have none of what he might 
have from the shop-window, dishonestly or honestly. The paradox of course – 
the irresolvable tension – is between coition which occurs through the glass 
pane – in a Pickwickian sense of ‘occurs’ – and actual intercourse that has as 
its necessary condition penetration, and/or rupture. Duchamp was a sexually 
experienced person, married twice, and with a long-term sexual relationship 
with Mary Reynolds. The element of fetishisation and auto-eroticism in his 
work is therefore puzzling. Lawrence D. Steffel Jr has referred to the Bride as 
‘autistic intercourse,’11 where the self-containedness of ‘autistic,’ would make 
nonsense of ‘intercourse.’ Intercourse, autistic is an oxymoron of some pathos. 
Both Steffel and Seigel agree that the postponement or even the avoidance of 
climax were for Duchamp-the-Artist (if – probably – not for Duchamp the 
chap) of the essence. Delay – and double delay – was de rigueur. Steffel writes 
in his essay ‘Marcel Duchamp and the Machine,’ richly and suggestively à 
propos Duchamp’s obscure and obscurely erotic ‘machines’ and of the system 
of designed-nonsense in which they do exist. All of the following, dense, 
passage, is necessary to my argument: 
… a game is “Dadaized” by Duchamp, who takes the limited space 
to be the translucency of a glass panel or the emptiness of a room 
where we find a Readymade, while the limited time may be a 
                                                        
10 Pierre Cabanne, Dialogues with Marcel Duchamp, pp. 88-89  
11 Lawrence D. Steffel, ‘Duchamp and the Machine’, in Marcel Duchamp,  
eds Anne d’Harnoncourt and Kynaston McShine (Prestel Verlag: The Museum of  
Modern Art and Philadelphia Museum of Art, 1973), p. 76. 
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minute, an hour, or a whole life. The objects and counters in the 
Duchamp game are, of course, the paraphernalia of machines and 
mechanisms, but they are also forms and systems, illusions and 
mirrorings (literal or figurative), titles and imports – all of which are 
the counter personae and presences of Duchamp’s “works.” The 
field of play is not only the “perspective” of the images (and the 
perspectives we bring to them), but the ambiance of the works in 
relation to the perceptual and conceptual rapports of the viewers of 
these works. According to the “fixed” rules, which always seem to 
be asking to be changed as we play the game, we begin by taking 
seriously what we see, trying to make sense of the relationships we 
are faced with – and then abandon that seriousness in favour of Dada 
hilarity. The operation of chance is, on the whole, the opposition we 
face: chance as distraction and lack of sense. But our opponent is 
also the imagery itself (we must “take” the chance), which must be 
mastered by going beyond the plausible. In this respect Duchamp’s 
nonsense is a set of strict relationships and a matter of flexibility, a 
paradox to reason but a new and very twentieth-century poetic of 
converting the given and the banal into apparitional potency. The 
scale of conversion from the givens and grinders and dummies, of 
cylinders and scissors, of hatracks and typewriter covers to the 
freedom of unimpeded hyperbolic thought is so great that only a kind 
of “short circuit” of intelligibility can lead us from the pathos to the 
ethos of the Large Glass and the Readymades, happy or unhappy, 
which are its offspring or counterparts. This short circuit of our 
normal ways of using visual imagery is grounded in the logic of 
mental relations subject to its own laws, limited and controlled by 
reason and will, set within and against a suppressed power of cogent 
irrationality. Dedicated basically to “balance and safety,” this logic 
of mental relations, which is “nonsense” instead of “sanity,” 
postpones the effect of climax which is orgasmic irrationality.12 
The key terms are game (chess/Ready-making?), Dada-ized, and orgasmic. The 
haunting notion is of ‘rules which always seem to be asking to be changed as 
we play the game’: such a game would be nonsense, ‘cogent irrationality.’ One 
might by tempted just to say: ‘Duchamp moves from the mechanics of the 
erotic to the eroticisation of the mechanical: and makes a nonsense of it.’ But 
this would not do justice to Steffel’s points. However, we cannot go into a full 
exegesis here. 
The ‘short circuit’; here in lines three and four of the quotation 
immediately above matches, perhaps, the ‘round trip’ in Duchamp’s shop-
window passage. The ‘suppressed power of cogent irrationality’ is such that 
one can never get to the point – i.e. the now new point – of the denatured 
                                                        
12 Steffel, ‘Duchamp and the Machine’, p. 76. 
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readymade-made-Ready-made. How constructed – ‘cogent’ – irrationality 
postpones is perhaps obvious enough here. How it prevents us getting the point 
of the joke is clear: why the ‘irrationality’ is ‘orgasmic’ has nothing much to 
do with the irrationality, and all to do with Duchamp’s cashing out of free-
beauty and its particular free play of the cognitive faculties, in his system at 
least, as erotic. The fetishisation of the denatured object, the eroticisation of the 
so-innocent mere mechanical artefact, is what is made in making a ready-made 
a Ready-made. The erotic and the mechanical are in the art of Francis Picabia 
and Duchamp stranded together in a thread: but they are not, in the non-Dada 
world, mutually entailed. Though, with its claims of access to the unconscious, 
dada – and with it Duchamp – can eroticise ad lib: eroticisation may, indeed, 
be, to the Unconscious, obligatory. Duchamp’s window-shopper’s fetishising 
gaze expressed not waking life in which we are cool, but is a function, if 
anything, of the volcanic unconscious. Duchamp conflates consciousness and 
the unconscious in an implausible way. 
Here are two things that need to be said of the ‘logic’ of all this. First, 
fetishisation gives everything the same point – if it still, then (considering the 
principle of difference), counts as a point. It all depends on how you feel? 
Second, nonsense, as nonsense, deprives everything of its point – so nothing 
has a point: the meta-game of Ready-mades – denatured objects recycled as 
Duchampian whatevers circulating forever in a closed system – is as deprived 
of point as are the readymade objects made apt-to-be-Ready-mades deprived of 
theirs. Fetishisation unites all point-full-nesses under the erotic: nonsense 
unites all point-full-nesses under the pointless. 
The principle of difference, to which one feels wedded, can only deplore 
such dodgy unities; of this, more later. We shall have, in the remainder of this 
paper, to go in to the nexus – real or fudged – between total eroticism and total 
pointlessness. Though, if one is a Dada-ist of the Unconscious, or has orgasmic 
relations with things in shop windows, the following pages may seem otiose. 
 
Indifference and Delay 
Many of Duchamp’s works are witty in a sense immediately accessible – more 
or less – to persons not in the play of what I have called elsewhere The Free 
Playground (of the Free-Eroticised-Play of the Cognitive Faculties). Fresh 
Widow, a carpenter-made pair of windows ‘glazed’ in shining black leather is a 
joke one might get without going all the way with Duchamp. Seigel, however 
fits – ‘even’ – it into a larger play – and a play of sexual paradox: 
Fresh Widow was a glass altered so that the disillusionment that, in 
the note on shop windows, followed breaking the pane had no 
chance to occur. The work was therefore fittingly signed with the 
name Rrose Sélavy, the partner who, as the eros that is life, never 
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grants her lovers actual possession, keeping their desire fresh too. In 
this light, the proclaimed “freshness” of the widow derives from her 
inaccessibility to the new partner for which she is constantly 
“ready”; as long as she remains separated from the world by the 
opaque panes that symbolize her state, she exists as an instance of 
the condition where, to use again Walter Benjamin's phrase about 
Baudelaire, lovers are spared rather than denied fulfilment.13 
The fact that one cannot have all the sexual partners that one might desire – 
even Don Juan could not – does not negate the old folk wisdom ‘’tis better to 
have loved and lost than never to have loved at all.’ That one cannot, in the 
Biblical sense, know all the desirable persons one knows in the social sense, 
does not entail that to be ‘spaced rather than denied fulfilment’ is the best case 
scenario. 
And to make, here, a more or less logical point: If ‘all is erotic’ is the 
case, then the principle of difference which demands, ‘not all is erotic,’ or 
‘erotic’ loses any application or meaning’ is suspended, and all is in-differently 
erotic, in a sense which would exhaust all lust, and/or issue in no choice of 
some objects over other objects. Indifference in the psychological sense might 
well supervene on this in-difference of any (erotic) objects from any other 
(erotic) object. Duchamp plays slyly with ‘indifference’ in a principle of 
difference sense, and indifference in a psychological one: in an almost 
Jansenist psychological one, at that. To put it another way: delay might become 
permanent. 
 
Recapitulation 
To recapitulate: (a) it is not self-evident that an object in a shop window is 
better as a window-shopper’s-virtually-aesthetic-object than it would be as an 
item bought: consequently the taboo on shopping is not perspicuous as to its 
ratio: (b) Duchamp’s willed-apatheia seems to be less free-standing than 
consequent upon the question: ‘If all is desirable in this array, upon the same 
terms, where could one begin choice?’ Better be, then, like Buradin’s ass and 
not begin at all! (One can, of course, have an overwhelming plethora of objects 
in an un-Duchampized shop window, sufficient thus to block choice, without 
these object being fetishes in any more than the Marxist sense. Window 
displays of e.g. cheap electric watches can surfeit the eye and head off all 
desire to purchase.) 
                                                        
13 Seigel, The Private Worlds of Marcel Duchamp, p. 168. Seigel’s extension of the notion 
of the glass unbroken to Duchamp’s ampoule of Air de Paris (1919) is exemplary; and it 
renders the idea of being ‘spared fulfilment’ a little less blank: but it does not fill it in 
enough for one to embrace the absence itself of The Distant Beloved. 
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Kant thought that “apatheia in a mind that follows its unanswering 
principles is sublime”14 and abstaining from shopping on principle might – in 
its own way – be sublime, if only one knew the principle and its ratio.15 
Muffing his sublimity might well leave Duchamp biting his thumbs: but the 
matter of principle remains unclear: all we have is the pun-consequence: ‘If all 
difference between objects in an array is cancelled by their being in-differently 
fetishes, then we might well be indifferent – in the psychological sense – to one 
and all of them.’ 
 
Cogent Irrationality as the Fetishisation of Banal Artefacts: Can it 
Constitute a Tradition in Art? 
Duchamp has his followers still, some to be treated with hollow laughter, 
others with attention.16 The pane of glass that desire might cut, but which 
remains intact, and a fully erotic sense of desire, come up in a recent art 
object/event in Chile where performance artist Danellia Tobor went about her 
daily functions, showering and so on, in a house of glass, watched by an – 
excluded but interested – public.17 Here is a nice Duchampian window-piece. 
There is a Duchampian reading of this: a Playboy one; and a political reading, 
i.e. ‘there ought to be more transparency in public life in Chile.’ The 
Duchampian interpretation out-does his own reflections on the window-pane 
and his praxis as a window dresser. The best Duchamp managed was to dress 
up in semi-undress a mannequin in a book-shop window or put one such into a 
dada exhibition. Undressing a real live lady behind glass walls with her 
bachelors beyond the pale was not possible until so recently as 1999(?) – 
perhaps? 
 
Duchamp’s Shop-Window Argument Again: the full Q.E.D. 
It may be useful to look, now, at a fuller version of Duchamp’s shop window 
passage to see how it works/or does not work, in relation to its own claim, 
‘Q.E.D.’ 
The question of shop windows  
                                                        
14 Kant, The Critique of Aesthetic Judgement, p. 124 
15 The ratio of ‘never–shop’ might be delay. But delay remains – as Duchamp uses it – as 
unperspicuous as is the window-not-cutting example under which it would fall. As a cure for 
premature ejaculation, total sexual abstinence would be a way of coping, but not by any 
means obviously the best. 
16 See the chapter ‘Hollow Laughter’ on the Duchampian heritage in Matthew Collings, This 
is Modern Art (London: Weidenfield & Nicolson, 1999). 
17 For more information on the performance artist Danellia Tobor in the glass-walled house 
see Duncan Campbell, ‘When Private Goes Public, the Result is Clear’, The Age (28 
January, 2000). 
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To undergo the interrogation of shop windows  
The exigency of the shop window  
The shop window proof of the existence of the outside world  
When one undergoes, the examination of the shop window, one also 
pronounces one’s own sentence. In fact, one’s choice is “round trip.” 
From the demands of the shop windows, my choice is determined. 
No obstinacy, ad absurdism, of hiding the coition through a glass 
pane with one or many objects of the shop window. The penalty 
consists in cutting the pane and in feeling regret as soon as 
possession is consummated. Q.E.D.18 
Is Duchamp a solipsist who having proved solipsism true has, then, no one to 
talk to about it? Or is he a solipsist who does not wish to share his solitude 
with any more than he now shares it with? These quips are not gratuitous. In 
Cabanne’s Dialogues With Marcel Duchamp we find, “I’ve always felt this 
need to escape myself.”19 It comes up merely à propos his inclusion of a 
direction-arrow in the earliest of the grinder works (the one painted for his 
brother’s kitchen), but it is set in the context – too – of Duchamp’s famous 
remark about art in general, ‘Without knowing if I had opened a window on to 
something else.’ An avowal of a felt need to escape oneself need not indicate a 
solipsistic condition: but joined with the remark ‘I’m going to count on no one 
but myself alone’, it has a solo-to-solipsistic tone to it. And the phrase ‘round 
trip’ in the shop-window passage is suggestive of a degree of solipsism. 
Windows, even on to ‘something else,’ for Duchamp seem to serve as mirrors 
of oneself, not just as ‘proving the existence of the outside world.’ 
And: as Duchamp is not Descartes, there is something a little odd in his 
hankering to prove the existence of the outside world: this is a 
problem/‘problem’ for the bare cogito, but not one of everyday life. This is 
how the whole passage on the coffee-grinder painting goes: 
DUCHAMP: I did a coffee grinder which I made to explode; the 
coffee is tumbling down beside it; the gear wheels are above, and the 
knob is seen simultaneously at several points in its circuit, with an 
arrow to indicate movement. Without knowing it, I had opened a 
window onto something else. 
That arrow was an innovation that pleased me a lot – the 
diagrammatic aspect was interesting from an aesthetic point of view. 
CABANNE: It had no symbolic significance? 
DUCHAMP: None at all. Unless that which consists in introducing 
slightly new methods into painting. It was a sort of loophole. You 
know, I’ve always felt this need to escape myself. 
                                                        
18 The fuller version of the shop-window passage is from Michel Sanouillet and Elmer 
Peterson (eds), The Writings of Marcel Duchamp (New York: Da Capo, 1973), p. 74. 
19 Cabanne, Dialogues with Marcel Duchamp, pp. 88-89.  
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CABANNE: What did the painters you knew thing of these 
experiments? 
DUCHAMP: Not much. 
CABANNE: Did they consider you a painter? 
DUCHAMP: For my brothers, there was no question. They didn’t 
even discuss it. Besides, we didn’t talk about those things very 
much... 
You remember that the “Nude Descending a Staircase” had been 
refused by the Indépendants in 1912. Gleizes was back of that. The 
picture had caused such a scandal that before the opening he 
instructed my brothers to ask me to withdraw the painting. So you 
see... 
CABANNE: Did that gesture count among the reasons that pushed 
you to adopt an antiartistic attitude later? 
DUCHAMP: It helped liberate me completely from the past, in the 
personal sense of the word. I said, “All right, since it’s like that, 
there’s no question of joining a group – I’m going to count on no one 
but myself, alone.”20 
This may – or may not – make clear why the ‘interrogation’ of the shop-
window must always get the response ‘I am no shopper.’ The tension between 
‘needing to escape from oneself’ and ‘counting on myself alone’ might make a 
good mainspring for ‘cogent irrationality,’ and issue in a kind of: ‘let’s play – 
at least – at solipsism’. Closing himself in a glass box – so to put it – Duchamp 
felt the need to get out more: but the glass must remain uncut, if the solipsistic 
and free playground games are to go on. Duchamp as it were moves into 
Brentano’s window, as a long-term tenant, and needs all the living-room he can 
get there. ‘No more objects, please!’ Outside looking in, inside looking out, the 
glass must remain intact, both to ensure the perpetual window-shop-status of 
objects, and to contain the counters in the Free Play Ground Game which 
Duchamp – for a lifetime – played by denaturing r so as to produce R: while 
making of the array of R’s a game without sense of closure. Duchamp was, as 
long as he lived, as well as being the first performative-utterance-art utterer, 
the first performance artist. 
Consumption of objects is a consummation devoutly to be un-wished. 
The smell pun on consumption/consummation may be the big Idea behind 
Duchamp’s lifelong project. So much did he delay that he made Etant donnés a 
posthumous exhibit, thus denying himself its scandal and its success. 
 
                                                        
20 Cabanne, Dialogues with Marcel Duchamp, p. 88-89 
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Tentative Conclusions 
In the earlier paper I suggested that the oeuvre of Duchamp (at least the Ready-
made segment) constituted a Free Playground for the – here curious – 
Duchampian free play of the cognitive faculties. It is a closed world, like 
Duchamp’s beloved chess; Steffel seems to suggest something of the sort too. 
The solipsist has only himself to play with. But it takes two to play chess as 
opposed to doing chess problems, and Duchamp is as lonesome as can be. A 
problems man, at bottom, then. 
I choose to relate aspects of Duchamp to two Kantian ideas, (i) free 
beauty and, (ii) the free play of cognitive faculties. Why free beauties are to be 
preferred to adherent ones Kant never fully makes clear. And on ‘the free play 
of the cognitive faculties’, he is so stingy with examples, that the notion is left 
up in the air. And this can have unfortunate consequences. Duchamp – as it 
were – does two things, (a) he makes free beauty, or the freeing of objects from 
their implicit teleology, a necessary condition of them being made Ready-
mades. And (b) the interest which Ready-mades – erstwhile free beauties – 
have in the Duchamp Play Ground is that they are fetishes. The too-general 
notion of the free play of the cognitive faculties is replaced by the too-specific 
one of erotic fascination.21 This is a move that would have scandalised Kant. 
Taking ‘the free play of the cognitive faculties’ and making it pan-erotic would 
have been for Kant – and for common sense – to subvert its very freedom. 
Freedom from passion, interest, and so on, was for Kant the essence of his 
aesthetics as well as his ethics. And: few systems of aesthetics have no place 
for aesthetic distance; however defined, this would exclude active fetishisation. 
The shop-window ‘coition’ with objects of course – as we have already 
noted collapses the three Duchampian moves into one: the erotic gaze of itself 
fetishises. In the ‘three’ move account of the necessary condition of a Ready-
made is that it be made unready for what the manufacturer made it for/to do: 
the sufficient condition is that it be anointed ‘Ready-made!’ by a Magus: the 
                                                        
21 The geometric and inanimate conjoined to – polymorphous? – sexuality is prefigured 
perhaps in James Joyce’s, A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, ed. R. B. Kershner 
(Boston: Bedford Books, 1993), p. 181. In the famous Scholastic exchange between Stephen 
and Lynch, Stephen says of St Thomas’ visa in Pulcra suut quae visa placent “This word, 
though it is vague, is clear enough to keep away good and evil which excite desire and 
loathing. It means a stasis and a kinesis, also a stasis of the mind. You would not write your 
name in pencil across the hypotenuse of a right–angled triangle. – ‘No’ said Lynch. ‘Give 
me the hypotenuse of the Venus of Praxiteles.’” 
Joyce’s stasis becomes Duchamp’s – perpetual – delay? And Lynch would be just the boyo 
for Picabia and Duchamp. The – impossibly tense – play of strictness and excess is 
Duchampian to a high degree. Duchamp is at once Stephen and Lynch; or Jansenist and 
roué. 
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upshot is that it is, thereby, eroticised. The vocabulary of Duchamp, in the 
window-piece and pervasively throughout his works, involved his making-of-
art in fetishisation. The famous episode of Duchamp’s playing, at a 
retrospective in Pasadena, chess with a naked woman makes for a useful 
connection of ideas: free beauty, play, the erotic object come together in that 
elegant suburb of Los Angeles. Had the lady not been able to play chess, then 
the point of the exercise would have been the stronger. 
If fetishised, an object enters the world of the polymorphous-perverse: it 
is always interesting, and seductive – but often leaves one with the taste of 
ashes in the mouth. 
What has been missed in our discussion of Duchamp under two Kantian 
rubrics is that other things than sexuality can be polymorphous: and that 
without preordained perversity. Attention for instance is essentially 
polymorphous.22 What makes polymorphous sexuality perverse is that 
sexuality is understood to come with an appropriate range of objects and 
circumstances. Procreation – if you pursue ‘Huguenot strictness,’ as you may. 
Or intercourse of some kind with a member of the opposite sex; or same sex if 
you are that way determined/inclined, and are PoMo etc. The ethics of the 
matter are not our concern here. The pragmatics of the matter are such that if 
we call sexual objects ‘appropriate’ a priori (and we do) a name needs to be 
found for inappropriate objects, and conventionally these are dubbed fetishes. 
Sexuality is object-tied in a way in which attention is not. Attention is 
innocently polymorphous: its imminent teleology is not to pursue only certain 
kinds of – as it were – objects. Of course attention may fall, as any human 
being may fall, from innocence: but cases need to be specified and debated. 
Attention comes with a freedom built in, de jure. It is spontaneity. Its range and 
scope cannot be delimited in advance. 
All cases of ‘the free play of the cognitive faculties’ (special subsets of 
attention) need, however, to be specified, and if not exactly debated, at least 
exhibited or the notion remains, (a) empty; (b) consequently liable to entry by 
squatters such as Marcel Duchamp. 
Some attention has a working ground of utility: whether one is doing 
philosophy or painting the house, attention is bound to the task, and all tasks 
                                                        
22 A remark in conversation made by my friend and colleague Dr G. D. Marshall 
serendipitously drew my attention to attention, and I have made my own use of it here (and 
blame for the use is mine). One recollects Aristotle’s, “The mind becomes in a sense the 
thing known,” see Ronald M. Polansky, Aristotle’s De Anima: A Critical Commentary 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010 [2007]), p. 434-457, which allows for the 
play of mind across all types. 
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have exigencies. Born free, attention can very much go out to work. Or it can 
play, at home, or anywhere. 
Free play can run across n type of objects, potentially as different as are 
all the kinds of tasks. Some attention may be aesthetic – even ‘purely 
aesthetic.’ One model of that may be the model with which we began, that of 
genial window-shopping. Here adherent beauties may be set free by a regard 
which, (a) is aesthetic; (b) and, arguably, aesthetic precisely because it sets the 
objects of regard ‘free.’ Equally one may be an industrial-design buff, and 
admire the artefact a in the light of its aptness to function well. If this kind of 
judgement is not equally as aesthetic as is the taking of free beauties, then this 
needs to be argued. It is not self-evident. 
Aesthetic attention may have any number of kinds of focii. Socrates 
thought that a beautiful x was one well-to-splendidly-fashioned-for-its-purpose: 
Kant seems both to discover and – perhaps – to privilege free beauties; beauties 
freed of their purpose are the finest. Both philosophers may be ‘right’: it’s a 
matter of how one looks at the matter. 
 
Caveat 
One must, here, make the following point, as clearly as it may be: (a) The 
Kantian formula of ‘free play of the cognitive faculties’ does not homogenise 
aesthetic objects as fetishisation would. ‘Free play’ is a formal mode, admitting 
type differences between objects considered under it: (b) fetishisation however 
is the material mode, making all objects under it indifferently sexual objects. 
The ‘free play of the cognitive faculties’ enjoys the protean status of the ‘un-
free’ work of those faculties: there is no limit a priori to the objects of their 
concern, (even if there is a limit to their competences). 
And from (b) we have inferred, if only by way of a kind of pun, that: ‘if 
all objects are indifferently sexual, then sexuality which posits difference (of 
more than one kind too) might be met with psychological indifference, in a so-
indifferent universe of, sexual, discourse as that constituted by an array of 
fetishes.’ The pun on in-difference/ indifference is not, for all its limp logic lax. 
The world of Duchampian art is riddled with puns, and riddled with riddles, of 
which ‘when is a fetish not a fetish?’ is the chief. 
There is, it seems, only this – paronomastic – kind of link between 
ready-made objects becoming Ready-mades, and as Ready-mades, made 
fetishes, and Duchamp’s instance on window-shopping and the avoidance of 
ordinary shopping. The possibility of Ready-making of ready-mades freezes 
the shop-window, first denaturing, then fetishising the commodities exhibited 
therein. And if all is, indifferently, fetish, then psychological indifference 
supervenes, causing not mere delay but a total abstention from 
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possession/actualised-enjoyment of x-in-the-window. Possession would spoil 
all in Duchamp’s game. So: hold off! 
Binge shopping and the career of Don Juan may lead, for similar 
reasons, to utter dissatisfaction – a ‘biting of the thumbs’ – ‘even.’ But useful 
shopping, and erotic involvements of some obvious kinds, seem normal 
enough. And a fall from window-shopping into mere shopping does not always 
leave one unsatisfied, even if it ‘fractures’ the free-beauty aesthetic. Not all 
attention need be aesthetic: not all falls from the aesthetic are to be deplored. 
Not does the actual possession of x render impossible an aesthetic attitude to x. 
I may treat the picture on the wall of the room where I am writing this as a free 
beauty – even if I have seen it in a shop-window and paid money for it. 
Window-shopping is a kind of edge to the aesthetic: treating the display 
as ‘pleasing when seen,’ but not going in to buy may indeed be a type of the 
aesthetic. Collins Street and the Bourke Street Mall may be for one mixed 
aesthetic-utilitarian walks: and window and real shopping can peacefully co-
exist: The possibility of window-shopping does not entail any necessary 
unsatisfactoriness of all or any episodes of actual shopping. How could we 
actually live in terms, of free beauty only? We may occasionally cheat in the 
free vs adherent beauty thing by buying Alessi’s Philippe Starck orange-and-
lemon squeezers; but muesli is muesli, and we buy it with breakfast in mind, 
and it gets consumed/consummated. Kant, who was very unsatisfactory on 
freedom in general left us the inheritance – not altogether to be desired – of 
free beauties. 
 
Duchamp’s Ultimate Freedom – Beautiful? 
Steffel in the Catalogue affords Duchamp’s work the ultimate ‘freedom’: he 
regards it as cleverly and deliberately contrived nonsense, yielding to 
description but not to argument, transcending both the pointfulness of things 
and the suspension of this pointfulness, and so becoming itself a meta free-
beauty, or a free-beauty-doubled. 
Kantian free beauties can be laid open to – occasional – enjoyment; and 
even – equally occasional – explication. They form no homogeneous set: they 
may differ in type, etc. Duchampian ones are each an element in a display in 
which they have a role, as counters in a game which goes on without end. 
Nothing is for sale in Duchamp’s shop windows: it’s all needed for dressing 
the windows. It’s typecast in terms of the game: and the typecasting is a 
function of eroticisation or fetishisation. Coition through glass. 
If this is so, then Duchamp’s window-shopping is not as genial as 
looking into Henry Buck’s window while waiting for a tram: and like a 
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sentence of Joyce’s, Duchamp’s visual non-merchandising demands a 
lifetime’s attention: it demands his, anyhow. 
Meanwhile, actual life for the rest of us goes on elsewhere, and our vital 
attention to Duchamp’s game-in-a-vitrine is displaced by more pressing 
concerns. 
Attention may, having an indefinite number of objects, be 
polymorphous indeed. But it must also be limited: its not available indefinitely 
for any one object, or any one game. Some attention is strictly economical: 
some of it can be aesthetic, and the difference between the economic and the 
aesthetic is still debated. But all attention is: attention with respect to some x, 
whatever that type of x may be. It may be polymorphous: but its objects are all 
definite, and infinitely diverse. It may be that Duchamp’s free’d beauties, 
Ready-mades etc, if de-eroticised, leave one up-in-the-air with respect to any 
practical criticism of them. One can’t account for their being objects of ‘the 
free play of cognitive faculties’ in themselves: all the practical criticism of 
them there is exegesis, a discourse which relates them back to the Duchampian 
great game. The only practical criticism of a Readymade that is possible is yet 
more exegesis of Duchamp’s Great Game. 
Ordinary ‘free beauties’ are free-standing, and not bound to a scheme: 
Kant’s flowers, parrots and crustacea are separate from each other, and 
separate objects of ‘free play of the cognitive faculties.’ How free play plays 
depends very much on what may be said about the – diverse – objects of the 
play. 
Attention is born free, but must needs much of the time to go out to 
work. Sometimes it goes to art galleries, or it window-shops. And it may, in an 
aesthetics seminar, attend to the similarities/difference between the gallery 
glass case and the shop’s window. And convention strictly regulates the time-
limit of seminars. So it should. 
Nonsense is a game without an end-game endlessly deferring meaning: 
and it must of necessity, so, weary attention. Equally: it may attract some 
attention: as may indeed, just anything. Free beauty included. Or a Ready-
made – ‘even.’ 
 
Endnote 
One has not had occasion in this article to look at the role of chance in 
Duchamp. But the closing reference to nonsense recalls for me Edward Allen’s 
remark in ‘Penny Ante,’ in Literary Las Vegas,  
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What I like most about gambling is that it does not make sense. I 
find it comforting that in pursuit of its admittedly fraudulent 
promises I don’t have to pretend to make sense to myself.23 
This is true, probably, to the gambler’s experience – on the many ‘no win’ 
occasions of a gambling career. The realisation that most situations are ‘no 
win’ would be rational grounds for not gambling, but gambling not being a 
rational activity may (but need not) account for non-rational choices to do it. 
Does the base-line’s not making sense always entail the meta-line’s not making 
sense, too? 
As someone who spent two or more days in Las Vegas, without 
wagering a nickel, but treating the place as a gigantic spectacle, I find Edward 
Allen’s remark interesting. As a spectacle Vegas is a treat, if a rather odd one. 
Its baroque-tacky sets up a new province of the aesthetic: and the 
replications/quotations eg. In ‘New York New York’ and proposed Paris and 
Venice free fantasias, as well as the casino in the vast – and vastly elegant – 
black glass pyramid, are the very essence of Post-Modernism: and possibly its 
best examples. 
One can absolutely recommend, in Vegas, Duchampian 
delay/abstention. And the Kantian idea of getting all this, more or less, for free 
gives free-beauty a whole new dimension. 
 
                                                        
23 Edward Allen, ‘Penny Ante’, in Literary Las Vegas, ed. Mike Tronnes (New York: Henry 
Holt, 1995), p. 134. 
